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EASTMAN KODAK v BELL & HOWELL." A REAFFIRMATION
OF THE "REASONABLENESS" STANDARD
Eastman Kodak Company v. Bell & Howell Document Management
Products Company, 994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
Vincent T. Sampsont
INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Man-
agement Products Co.,' affirmed the decision of the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (Board) of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
that held numeric designators (or "marks") are not presumptively de-
scriptive under the Lanham Act (Act).2 The court further held that
this presumption was valid when the marks were applied for in intent-
to-use applications.3 The court also noted that the issue of whether the
marks are descriptive cannot be resolved until the marks are used. Fi-
nally, the court stated that the numeric marks in this case did not re-
quire a secondary meaning in order for the marks to be valid
trademarks.
BACKGROUND
Bell and Howell Document Management Company (B&H) is in
the business of manufacturing microfilm reader/printers. On October
12, 1990, B&H filed intent-to-use applications to register the numbers
"6200", "6800" and "8100" on the Principal Register.4 Eastman Ko-
dak Company (Kodak), a competitor in the manufacture of microfilm
reader/printers, filed a timely opposition to each of the three marks.
Kodak alleged that marks were merely descriptive in that they were to
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1. 994 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
2. ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended in the Trademark Law Revision Act
of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988)).
3. Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1), an intent-to-use application is filed when "a per-
son who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, to
use the trademark in commerce."
4. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Management Products Co., 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1878 (T.T.A.B. June 8, 1992).
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be used only as model designators. Based on this argument, Kodak
claimed that registering the marks would be improper.
The issue of descriptiveness was brought before the Board. B&H
filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there were no is-
sues of material fact regarding the alleged mere descriptiveness of the
numeric marks and, in the alternative, that Kodak had no standing to
oppose the intent-to-use applications. Kodak then filed a cross motion
for summary judgment. The Board held that (1) Kodak did have
standing to oppose the applications and (2) the issue of mere descrip-
tiveness could not be resolved until use had begun. Accordingly, the
Board denied Kodak's motion for summary judgment on the issue of
descriptiveness and dismissed the oppositions without prejudice. As a
result of the Board's decision, B&H was granted a notice of allow-
ance.5 Kodak appealed the Board's decision. Kodak's appeal was
based only on the issue of descriptiveness.
DISCUSSION
The court stated at the outset of its decision: "The principal issue
in this case is whether the Board's implied creation of a presumption
in favor of the applicant for a numerical mark intended for use as more
than a model designator is a reasonable interpretation of the Board's
authority under the Lanham Act."6 The Eastman Kodak court con-
cluded that the Board's decision was a reasonable exercise of its au-
thority under the Chevron doctrine.7
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,8 the Supreme Court established a test to determine the validity of
an agency's interpretation of a statute that an agency administers. The
Chevron doctrine consists of a two-step analysis.9 The first step re-
quires the court "to determine whether Congress has directly ad-
dressed the precise issue in question."'" If Congress has directly
addressed the issue, the agency and court reviewing the agency's in-
terpretation are required "to give effect to the unambiguously ex-
5. Under the Lanham Act the procedure is as follows: after the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) issues a notice of allowance, the applicant has six months to file a statement that
confirms that the mark is being used in commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (d)(1) (1988). At the end
of this six month period, the intent to use statement is reexamined by the PTO to satisfy itself
that the mark is registerable. If the PTO is satisfied, the mark is issued a registration. Id. § 1051
(d)(1).
6. Eashan Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1571.
7. Id. at 1571.
8. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. IM at 842.
10. Id
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pressed intent of Congress."" If, however, the statute does not
directly address the precise issue in question, the second step of Che-
ron is to determine whether the agency's decision was based on a
permissible construction of the statute.' 2 Thus, a reviewing court
must determine if the agency's interpretation was "reasonable."' 3
The court in Eastman Kodak began its analysis of the Board's
decision by noting that in order for the Board to dismiss Kodak's op-
positions without prejudice, the Board would have had to conclude
that the numeric marks were presumptively not descriptive under sec-
tion 2(e) of the Act when those marks are applied for in intent-to-use
applications under section l(b) of the Act.' 4 As the starting point of
its analysis under the Chevron doctrine, the court examined the lan-
guage of the Act, specifically § 2(e), which addresses denial of regis-
tration if a mark is descriptive. As a result of this examination, the
court concluded that the statute "on its face" did not preclude the
Board's decision. The court then turned to the 1988 legislative history
of the Act and concluded that the legislative history did not speak
directly to the issue. 5 The court noted that Congress intended most
marks applied for by way of intent-to-use applications were to be re-
viewed for descriptiveness at the initial examination stage. This was
interpreted by the court to mean that the PTO has the duty to confirm
that the mark applied for actually functions as a mark. The court
stated that the legislative history emphasized that the Act permitted
the PTO to "raise issues of registrability that might not be evident
until the applicant makes available specimens showing the mark as
used and/or clarifying the nature of the goods and services in-
volved."' 6 The court concluded that although the legislative history
and the express language of the statute did not address the issue pre-
cisely, Congress had provided for situations similar to the case at bar.
The court's final point in its discussion of the first step of the Chevron
doctrine was that Congress, in order to reduce an applicant's uncer-
tainty with respect to his financial investment before a mark is put into
commercial use, dictated that the opposition process be in place before
an "intent-to-use mark" had been put into use. The court added that
Congress was aware of some issues that may arise that cannot be re-
solved in the opposition proceedings and must wait until the post-use
11. Id. at 842-43.
12. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
13. Id. at 868; Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1571.
14. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1571.
15. Id. at 1572.
16. Id. at 1572, citing H.R. REP. No. 1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988) reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577.
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PTO examination period. The court thus concluded that the Board's
interpretation of the Act "does not contravene any clear and unambig-
uous statutory meaning."' 7
In part II of the court's analysis, it concluded that "the Board's
construction is a reasonable interpretation of the Lanham Act.""8 It is
at this point that the court set out Kodak's arguments and addressed
them individually. Kodak's five arguments were: (1) "the Board's de-
cision [was] unreasonable because it ... preclude[d] asserting mere
descriptiveness as a basis for denying word and number marks in in-
tent-to-use applications;"'" (2) the Board's decision was unreasonable
in that it effectively eliminated § 2(e) of the Act;20 (3) "the Board's
decision [was] unreasonable because it allegedly create[d] a different
standard for registrability for intent-to-use applications from use-based
applications with regard to descriptiveness, contrary to statutory de-
sign;' 21 (4) the timing difference allowed by the Board was prejudicial
in that the challenger faces a presumption that the mark is valid and
also allows an applicant to "tie up" several numeric marks; and (5) the
marks in this case were merely descriptive and required a showing of
secondary meaning.22 The court dismissed each argument raised by
Kodak.
The court's response to Kodak's first argument, that descriptive-
ness would be precluded as a reason for denying registration, was
threefold. First, the court reasoned that the examining attorney could
initially determine that some marks bearing certain words and phrases
are prima facie merely descriptive.23 Thus, this type of mark would
not survive the initial screening step. Second, § 1051(d)(1) of the Act
provides for a second examination of the mark after the statement of
use is filed, thus ensuring that descriptive marks will not be automati-
cally passed to registration. The court also noted that this subsection
even requires, in some instances, "a complete reexamination" of the
application.24 Third, the court pointed out that the Trademark Exami-
nation Guide (TEG) 3-89 set forth the standard for examination of the
statement of use. This standard is for legal error (i.e., descriptiveness)
in an application that is being reviewed. The attorney examining the
application must make a "de novo determination on any issue that
17. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1572.
18. Id. at 1572.
19. Id.
20. Ma at 1574.
21. Id at 1574.
22. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1576.
23. Id. at 1573.
24. Id.
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would effect the legal correctness of registration."'  The court stated
that the descriptiveness of a mark is such an issue and under reexami-
nation, the examining attorney must not refuse the mark unless it is
mandated by "changed circumstances."26 The court stated that even if
the use of the mark constituted "changed circumstances," these cir-
cumstances would not be known until after the statement of use is
filed and the marks are being reexamined. At this time, if the marks
are determined to be descriptive, the examining attorney must refuse
the marks or face registering a mark in violation of the Act.
The court regarded Kodak's contention that § 2(e) of the Act
would be in effect eliminated as "unavailing."'27 The court stated that
Kodak's analysis "would eliminate the use of intent-to-use applica-
tions for any mark that could possibly be used as a model designa-
tor."28 The court's reading of the statute showed no language
precluding intent-to-use applications that have any type of numeric
mark. For this reason, the court concluded that the Board's decision
not to adopt Kodak's position was reasonable.
As to Kodak's assertion that the Board created separate standards
for intent-to-use applications and use-based applications, the court rea-
soned that the Board only adopted a presumption that a mark is not
merely descriptive "in the absence of evidence of how it is actually
used."'2 9 The court stated that if the PTO judges a mark to be merely
descriptive in an intent-to-use application, it will deny registration for
that mark just as it would if applied for in a use based application.
Thus, "the standard that the PTO applies in either case is the same -
only the timing of such review is different."30 Again, the court con-
cluded that the Board's interpretation was reasonable.
Kodak had attacked this difference in timing, claiming that the
difference "relegates questions of descriptiveness to post-registration
cancellation proceedings."'" Kodak claimed that this delay was preju-
dicial in that there is a presumption of validity in cancellation proceed-
ings. The court responded by stating that the burden of proof in both
opposition and cancellation proceedings is a preponderance of the
evidence. 3
2
25. Id. at 1573.
26. Id.
27. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1574.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1574.
30. Id. at 1574.
31. Id. at 1575.
32. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1575, citing 2 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON
TaAKs AND UNFAM CoMPE=moN § 20.16 (3d ed. 1992).
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The court went on to refer to the policy reasons behind placing
the opposition proceeding before actual use had occurred. Thus, "any
prejudice flowing to Kodak from this arrangement cannot render the
Board's decision an unreasonable one in light of the statute." 33 As to
the contention that applicants would be able to "tie up" certain marks
by requesting extensions for filing a statement of use, the court noted
that Kodak's argument "failed to acknowledge... certain important
requirements that the applicant must meet during the application pro-
cess." 34 In particular the court pointed out that: (1) an applicant must
specify in the original application the bona fide intention to use the
mark and the manner in which it is to be used pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
1051 (b)(1)(A); (2) in order for an applicant to receive the first exten-
sion, an applicant must file a verified statement showing a continued
bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce; and (3) there must
be a showing of good cause for each extension thereafter. The court
concluded that, since the applicant must provide the PTO with sub-
stantive information to delay a filing of a statement of use, an appli-
cant may not indefinitely extend the filing period and "tie up" marks
as Kodak argued.
Kodak's final contention was that B&H's marks were to be used
as model designators; thus, there needed to be a showing of secondary
meaning. Without this showing, Kodak claimed, the marks were not
registerable. The court stated that even if Kodak was correct in as-
suming that the marks may be used for model designators, the conclu-
sion that the marks are not registerable is "not dispositive. '3 5 The
court held that "in order for B&H's marks to be found to be merely
descriptive, they must be solely used as model designators and in any
source indicating function."3 The court turned to prevailing Board
authority which held that the nature and manner of use of an alphanu-
meric designation can show that the designation is inherently distinc-
tive.37 As a final comment to Kodak's conclusion that the marks
would necessarily be merely descriptive, the court noted that the PTO
33. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1575.
34. Id. at 1575 n.8.
35. Id. at 1576.
36. Id. at 1576. It is interesting to note that the court did not cite Intel Corp. v. Advanced
Micro Devices, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1991) in its discussion of secondary meaning.
The cases are distinguishable in that they involve different issues. In Intel, the court was con-
cerned with whether Intel had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the mark "386"
was not generic in the trademark sense. In the instant case, the court was faced with a trademark
issue, but the main focus was the reasonableness of the Board's decision. Thus, although the
cases may have appeared somewhat similar, they involve much different issues.
37. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1576, citing Neapco Inc. v. Dana Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1746 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 30, 1989).
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had already granted registration of one numeric mark and one alpha-
numeric mark. s
CONCLUSION
The court was charged with addressing the issue of whether the
Board created a presumption that was an unreasonable exercise of its
authority under the Lanham Act. The court's ultimate conclusion was
that the Board's decision was reasonable in light of the Chevron doc-
trine. The court held that the Board's decision passed both steps set
forth in the doctrine. First, the decision did not conflict with any Con-
gressional mandate. Second, the decision was a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the Act to which the Board is associated. Every argument
advanced by Kodak was rebuffed in favor of the Board. Since Kodak
could not convince the court that the Board's decision was unreasona-
ble, the court affirmed the decision of the Board as a reasonable exer-
cise of its authority under the Chevron test.
38. Eastman Kodak, 994 F.2d at 1576, citing Eastman Kodak v. Bell & Howell Documents
Management Prods. Co., Nos. 86083, 86093, and 86101, slip op. at 4 (T.T.A.B. June 8, 1992).
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